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THE REASONABLE BELIEVER: FAITH, FORMALISM, AND
ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION
by
Paula Abrams∗
The reasonable observer standard, used in Establishment Clause cases to
determine whether government action endorses religion, marks a retreat
by the Court from vigorous scrutiny of government purpose and effect.
The standard, which examines whether a reasonable observer, familiar
with First Amendment values and with the history and context of
government action, perceives endorsement, embodies a shift toward
formalism in Establishment Clause doctrine.
This Essay argues that the reasonable observer standard, which
bypasses the role of faith in perception, undermines the protection of a
core Establishment Clause value—inclusion. The reasonable observer
standard, representing the abstracted perspectives of a “community” of
indeterminate faith, decreases the significance of the effect of government
action, particularly on the nonadherent. Application of the standard
thus tends to validate the perspective of the majority. The value of
inclusion is best served by an inquiry into purpose and effect that
considers the perceptions of both adherents and nonadherents.
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INTRODUCTION

On a cold December day, a reasonable observer hurries by the
county courthouse on her way home. She notices a decorated Christmas
tree and a lighted menorah on the courthouse lawn. Does this display
constitute state endorsement of religion? Under current doctrine, this
“objective” observer will determine whether the display is a secular
celebration of the holiday season or an impermissible endorsement of
religion. What makes her task difficult, however, is that this objective
observer lacks human qualities. She is emptied of human perceptions,
particularly perceptions drawn from her faith and beliefs. She is a
phantom created by the Court, charged with deciding whether a
government action communicates a message of endorsement, but
stripped of the belief system that would illuminate whether an actual
person would attribute a religious message to the government.
The reasonable observer was born from the Court’s efforts to
distance Establishment Clause doctrine from precedent that the Court
1
views as hostile to religion. The emergence of the reasonable observer
standard in Establishment Clause analysis marks a retreat by the Court
from vigorous scrutiny of the purpose and effect of government action.
The reasonable observer, as with most reasonable person standards, is a
legal fiction representing a hypothetical response to a set of
circumstances. But the reasonable observer lacks the one characteristic
most significant to Establishment Clause concerns—humanity. The
diverse reactions of adherents and nonadherents matter if the Court is to
2
take seriously a value central to the Establishment Clause: inclusion. This
value finds expression in the repeated statements by the Court that the
government may not favor one religious group, leaving nonadherents to
feel like outsiders in the political community and creating religious
3
strife.
1

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also infra note 6 and
accompanying text.
2
See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in
Newport, Rhode Island (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
Jul.–Nov. 1790, at 284, 285 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996) (“It is now no more
that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that
another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the
Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution
no assistance . . . .”).
3
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
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The reasonable or objective observer standard embodies a shift
toward formalism in Establishment Clause doctrine. Divested of beliefs,
the identity of the reasonable observer derives primarily from her
comprehensive knowledge of legislative history. Missing are indicia of
real human reactions. Viewed through the eyes of the reasonable
observer, the Establishment Clause inquiry is divorced from meaningful
analysis of whether government action sends an impermissible message
of endorsement of religion.
This Essay argues that the reasonable observer standard undermines
the value of inclusion by diminishing the significance of the effect of
government action, particularly on the nonadherent. The hypothetical
responses of the reasonable observer bypass the role of faith in
perception, distorting the evaluation of “reasonableness.” The reasonable
observer is no more than an empty suit. Predictably, her one-dimensional
viewpoint tends to validate the perspective of the majority. Establishment
Clause values are best served, instead, by a substantive inquiry into
purpose and effect that examines the perspectives of both adherents and
nonadherents.
II. LEMON AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
The foundational test employed by the Court in Establishment
4
Clause cases dates from the 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Lemon
requires that the government action: (1) have a secular purpose, (2) its
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
5
and (3) it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Lemon, which calls for intensive scrutiny of effect and entanglement, most
fully advances a separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Over time, the Lemon test has fallen into disfavor as a majority of the
6
Court has rejected a separationist approach. Justice Scalia has colorfully
described the Lemon test as “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
7
8
jurisprudence . . . . The Court, on occasion, has refused to apply Lemon.

concurring); see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court is Wrong About the
Establishment Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 228 (2001).
4
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5
Id. at 612.
6
See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“For my part, I agree with the long list of
constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange
Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent
use has produced.”).
7
Id. at 398.
8
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying coercion test).
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The disenchantment with Lemon led Justice O’Connor to propose
9
the endorsement test as an alternative. The endorsement test asks
whether the government action has the purpose or effect of endorsing
religion. Justice O’Connor first articulated the endorsement test in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case addressing whether the
Establishment Clause prohibited the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
10
from including a crèche in its annual Christmas display. Justice
O’Connor argued that the Establishment Clause prohibits government
11
“endorsement or disapproval of religion.” She emphasized the
significance of inclusion to the Establishment Clause: “Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
12
community.”
Inclusion is served by an endorsement test that is sensitive to a
diversity of perceptions. This sensitivity is most likely to be achieved
through a test that examines the purpose and effect of government
action through the eyes of the adherent and nonadherent. While the
purpose prong is largely an analysis of government intent, the effect
prong requires a court to determine “what message the city’s display
13
actually conveyed.” In Lynch, Justice O’Connor appears to recognize the
importance of examining actual effect. She claims that the resolution of
the effect prong involves “[e]xamination of both the subjective and the
objective components of the message communicated by a government
14
action” to see whether the action “carries a forbidden meaning.” The
subjective component to this inquiry is one that would consider how real
people would respond: “The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
15
message of endorsement or disapproval.” Justice O’Connor elaborates
on the importance of perception to that determination, explaining, “[i]t
is only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public
16
perception, to status in the political community.” She stresses that the
“crucial” concern is that a government practice “not have the effect of
17
communicating a message of government endorsement.” Perception,

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 668, 671 (majority opinion).
Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 692.
Id.
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however, is not wholly subjective; it is tempered by “what viewers may
18
fairly understand to be the purpose.”
The fair or reasonable perception of viewers is not simply a factual
question. In Lynch, Justice O’Connor rejects the significance placed by
the district court on the finding that the government’s display of the
19
crèche was “understood” to connote approval. Instead, she concludes
that “whether a government activity communicates endorsement of
20
religion is not a question of simple historical fact.” Evidentiary
submissions may be relevant, but “like the question whether racial or sexbased classifications communicate an invidious message,” the ultimate
question is “in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of
21
judicial interpretation of social facts.”
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
Over time, the endorsement test applied through the eyes of the
reasonable observer has garnered the support of a majority of the Court,
even though the Court may, in some decisions, use other tests, including
22
Lemon. While the Court may be willing to employ the reasonable
observer test, the standard presents two significant interpretive issues on
which the members of the Court do not agree. First, whose perspective
matters in the question of endorsement? An adherent to the faith
accommodated by the government action? Or a nonadherent, who may
be either a nonbeliever or an adherent to another faith? Second, if
perception is a matter of “what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose,” what knowledge and information should be attributed to the
reasonable observer? The evolution of the reasonable observer standard
from Lynch to the most recent decisions illuminates the substantial
dispute within the Court over formalism in Establishment Clause analysis.
A. The Reasonable Observer as Adherent
Applying the reasonable observer test in Lynch, Justice O’Connor
implicitly adopts the perspective of the adherent. The challenged display
placed the crèche among other traditional Christmas symbols, including
a Santa Claus house, Santa’s reindeer and sleigh, a Christmas tree, a
candy-cane pole, and carolers. Justice O’Connor found that “Pawtucket’s
display of its crèche . . . does not communicate a message that the
government intends to endorse the Christian beliefs represented by the
23
crèche.” Admitting that the crèche conveys a religious and indeed
18

Id.
Id. at 693.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 694.
22
See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (applying Lemon);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying coercion test).
23
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
19
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sectarian message, Justice O’Connor concludes that the addition of less
overtly religious symbols such as Santa’s sleigh “changes what viewers may
24
fairly understand to be the purpose of the display.” Completely ignoring
that the display includes only Christian symbols, Justice O’Connor insists
that both the symbols and the Christmas holiday have “very strong
25
secular components.”
Justice O’Connor’s assessment embodies the perspective of the
reasonable Christian: “The display celebrates a public holiday, . . . .
[which] generally is not understood to endorse the religious content of
the holiday, just as government celebration of Thanksgiving is not so
26
understood.” Although she does not explicitly identify the religion of
the viewer, Justice O’Connor’s assumption that government displays of
Christian symbols are not considered endorsements of religion strongly
suggests the viewpoint of the adherent. Likening the display of the
crèche to the printing of “In God We Trust” on coins, Justice O’Connor
equates the government’s recognition of Christmas with the far more
abstract and non-sectarian principle that the government may
acknowledge religion for the legitimate secular purpose of “solemnizing
27
public occasions.” She argues that the “ubiquity” of Christmas symbols
demonstrates that their display by the government is not understood as
28
conveying government approval of specific religious beliefs. In a
statement that may offend both adherents and nonadherents, Justice
O’Connor concludes that the display of the Christian crèche “serves a
secular purpose—celebration of a public holiday with traditional
29
symbols.”
This implicit incorporation of the viewpoint of the adherent negates
the purported objectivity of the reasonable observer standard. As Lynch
demonstrates, the endorsement analysis abdicates scrutiny of government
action if the reasonable observer merely legitimizes the choices of the
majority.
B. The Reasonable Observer as Nonadherent
Justice Stevens argues that the reasonable observer should stand in
the shoes of the nonadherent. To Justice Stevens, the standard’s failure
to consider the perspective of the nonadherent is at odds with the
“paramount” purpose of the Establishment Clause—to protect the
30
nonadherent from being made to feel like an outsider or a stranger.

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 693.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
25
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Justice Stevens claims that the proper endorsement question is whether
“some reasonable observers would attribute a religious message to the
31
State.”
Justice Kennedy, in criticizing the endorsement test, has argued that
32
the reasonable observer represents the view of the nonadherent. He
rejects the endorsement test in large part because evaluating government
action from the perspective of the reasonable nonadherent would
effectively prohibit the government from accommodating religion.
Justice Kennedy’s criticism reveals why it is unlikely that the current
Court will seriously evaluate endorsement from the perspective of the
nonadherent: “Few of our traditional practices recognizing the part
religion plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful
33
application of this formula.” Insisting that Presidential Thanksgiving
Proclamations, the Pledge of Allegiance, and our national motto would
all be invalidated under this approach, Justice Kennedy concludes that
either “scores” of traditional practices would succumb to the
endorsement test, or “it must be twisted and stretched to avoid
inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the
34
past.”
If inclusion is a “paramount” Establishment Clause value, the critical
perspective must certainly be that of the nonadherent. The adherent is
far more likely to see the government’s display of symbols as an
expression of shared community values and the status quo, not a
religious statement. This is particularly true when the display reflects the
majority religion.
C. The Reasonable Observer as Separate from Adherent and Nonadherent
The dispute over the faith of the objective observer erupted in
35
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter. In County of
Allegheny, a badly splintered Court debated the faith of the objective
observer. Justice Blackmun, writing for himself and Justice Stevens,
argued the views of both the adherent and the nonadherent must be
considered. Specifically, the Court must ascertain whether the
challenged government action “is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
36
the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.”
But, in evaluating whether two displays of Christmas and Chanukah
symbols constituted endorsement of religion, Justice Blackmun makes no
31

Id. at 807.
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655,
668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
33
Id. at 670.
34
Id. at 671–74.
35
See generally id. (majority opinion).
36
Id. at 597.
32
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effort to distinguish between the perspectives of the adherent and the
nonadherent. To the contrary, although Justice Blackmun describes the
symbols and the setting for the displays in great detail, he fails to evaluate
how adherent and nonadherent would perceive the displays.
Justice Blackmun returns to the faith of the observer at the end of
his opinion but in doing so he constructs a tension between faith and
reason. The objective observer does not embody either the adherent or
the nonadherent; her perspective is one of reason, not belief. Thus, the
perceptions of the adherent and the nonadherent are distinct from the
perception of reason. As Justice Blackmun describes:
While an adjudication of the display’s effect must take into account
the perspective of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish, as well as
of those who adhere to either of these religions, the
constitutionality of its effect must also be judged according to the
37
standard of a “reasonable observer.”
Justice Blackmun’s description of the test suggests that the views of
adherent and nonadherent are likely to conflict with the perceptions of
the reasonable observer. If the perspective of the reasonable observer
differs from that of adherent and nonadherent, what is the basis for her
perceptions? Does the reasonable observer represent a compromise
between the views of adherent and nonadherent or an alternate reality?
The Court offers no answers to these questions. But by distinguishing the
perspective of reason from that of faith, the Court discounts the
perceptions of both adherent and nonadherent.
D. The Reasonable Observer as the Community
38

In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, Justice O’Connor
remolds the reasonable observer into a shapeless manifestation of the
community. In Capitol Square Review, the Court upheld the Christmas
display of a Latin cross erected by the Ku-Klux-Klan in a public square
39
next to the state capitol. The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia found
the endorsement test inapplicable because the display was private
40
religious speech.
Justice O’Connor applies the endorsement test in her concurring
opinion and rejects a reasonable observer standard based on the
41
perspective of either the adherent or the nonadherent. Retreating from
her position in Lynch, Justice O’Connor distances the reasonable
observer from her humanity by insisting that she does not embody the
37
Id. at 620 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (citing Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985); see also Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
38
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
39
Id. at 758, 770 (opinion of Scalia, J.), 792 (opinion of Souter, J.).
40
Id. at 769 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
41
Id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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42

actual perceptions of individual observers. Instead, the reasonable
observer is intended to reflect the “collective,” objective response of the
43
political community “writ large.” The reasonable observer standard,
argues Justice O’Connor, cannot be about the perceptions of “particular
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of
44
viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe.” The flaw in a
reasonable observer standard based on actual perceptions is that displays
would “necessarily” be precluded as long as some passerby perceives
45
endorsement.
The reasonable observer, Justice O’Connor claims, is analogous to
the reasonable person in tort law, who “is not to be identified with any
ordinary individual” but should be viewed as “a personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective]
46
social judgment.” Thus, Justice O’Connor concludes, the question is not
whether any, or even some, reasonable person “might” perceive state
endorsement of religion for “[t]here is always someone who, with a
particular quantum of knowledge, reasonably might perceive a particular
47
action as an endorsement of religion.”
Justice O’Connor insists that the reasonable observer standard does
not disregard the values animating the Establishment Clause. Rather, her
standard “simply recognizes the fundamental difficulty inherent in
48
focusing on actual people.” But the perceptions of adherent and
nonadherent provide the only meaningful assessment of endorsement.
The Court’s disinclination to allow one passerby to render an
Establishment Clause veto is understandable. That concern can best be
addressed by determining the critical mass of objections that would
suffice for an Establishment Clause violation, not by substituting a
faceless community response for the reactions of adherent and
nonadherent.
Justice O’Connor may be accurate in concluding that a standard
based on the perceptions of adherents and nonadherents increases the
likelihood that government displays of religious symbols would be found
to be impermissible endorsements of religion. If so, the Court should be
wary of such displays, not employ an objective observer standard that
purports to value inclusion but ignores dissenting viewpoints.
The consequences of a standard that identifies the reasonable
observer as “a personification of a community ideal of reasonable

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 779–80 (alteration in original) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
47
Id. at 780.
48
Id.
43
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49

behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment” are fairly
predictable. The “collective social judgment” of reasonable behavior will
necessarily reflect the views of the majority.
E. The Reasonable Observer of Indeterminate Faith
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, Justice Stevens applied
the objective observer standard for the majority to invalidate a school
policy permitting a majority student vote on prayer before football
50
games, but he appears to back away from insisting that the reasonable
observer be identified as a nonadherent. Although Justice Stevens
criticizes the policy for failing to protect the minority of nonadherents,
he ultimately accepts Justice O’Connor’s formulation by concluding that
“[r]egardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the message,
an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive
the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of
51
approval.” Justice Stevens may be making the point that anyone,
whether adherent or nonadherent, would see government endorsement,
but he offers no insight into how the Court is to determine the
perspective of “anyone.”
The Court’s recent forays into displays of religious symbols, evident
in Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU, also leave unresolved
52
the identity of the reasonable observer. In McCreary County, the Court
struck down a display of the Ten Commandments in a county
53
courthouse. The majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, adds
another personality trait to the objective observer: reasonable memory.
Justice Souter describes the objective observer as someone who is not
“absentminded” but is presumed familiar with the text and legislative
54
history of the display. In Van Orden, Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion
upholding a different display of the Ten Commandments does not rely
55
on the endorsement test. Justice Stevens, dissenting, takes the view of
the nonadherent when he observes that the “unmistakably JudeoChristian message of piety would have the tendency to make
nonmonotheists and nonbelievers ‘feel like [outsiders] in matters of
56
faith, and [strangers] in the political community.’”
49
Id. at 780 (alteration in original) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
50
530 U.S. 290, 305–10(2000).
51
Id. at 308.
52
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545
U.S. 844 (2005).
53
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 856–58, 881.
54
Id. at 866.
55
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92.
56
Id. at 720 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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Justice Thomas, who is not a fan of the endorsement test, offers an
insightful critique of the reasonable observer standard in his Van Orden
concurrence. Justice Thomas discusses the vacuity of a reasonable
observer standard disconnected from belief. He argues that the Court’s
efforts to discern the reactions of an observer of “indeterminate religious
affiliation” fail to give sufficient weight to the concerns of both adherents
57
and nonadherents. At the same time, if the Court does consider the
perspectives of adherents and nonadherents, it will inevitably be forced
to choose between different views. The Court, Justice Thomas contends,
should not be in the business of deciding religious significance. He insists
58
the “Court’s effort to assess religious meaning is fraught with futility.”
IV. THE KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVER OR THE “ULTRAREASONABLE” OBSERVER?
59

In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O’Connor added flesh to the bones of
the reasonable observer, weighting her with an omniscient knowledge of
government purpose and action. In Jaffree, the Court held that Alabama’s
statute mandating a daily moment of silence in schools violated the
60
Establishment Clause. Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, once
again emphasized that one of the animating principles of the
Establishment Clause, and the endorsement test, is the concern that
“‘[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
61
religion is plain.’”
How this core principle is incorporated into the endorsement test is
far from “plain.” The standard urged by Justice O’Connor is “whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state
62
This standard, however, omits any substantive
endorsement.”
consideration of how government support may indirectly coerce religious
minorities. Instead, the objective observer is impregnated with a
comprehensive understanding of government action that inevitably shifts
her perspective away from that of a passerby, particularly a passerby from
a religious minority.
Not only is the objective observer charged with understanding the
factual context and political history of the government action, she also
must understand the delicate balance between Free Exercise values and
57

Id. at 696 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 697.
59
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
60
Id. at 41, 61.
61
Id. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration in original)
(quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
62
Id. at 76.
58
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the commands of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause
allows the government some leeway to accommodate religion to further
the free exercise of religion. To Justice O’Connor, the objective observer
63
must understand this “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause and be able to appreciate that the
government may, in fact, be accommodating religion. As Justice
O’Connor explains, “courts should assume that the ‘objective observer’ is
64
acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes.”
The debate about the knowledge attributed to the reasonable
65
observer emerged explicitly in Capitol Square Review. The opinions of
Justices O’Connor and Stevens confront the identity crisis suffered by the
reasonable observer under the endorsement test. Their open
disagreement on the knowledge to be attributed to the reasonable
observer reveals the underlying debate between formalism and realism
that has become the prevailing tension in Establishment Clause cases.
Justice O’Connor argues that the objective observer should be “more
66
informed” than the casual passerby of the display. She must be aware of
the “history and context of the community and forum in which the
67
religious display appears.” This includes information beyond simple
observation of the display. For example, in regard to the display at issue
in Capitol Square Review, it is not enough that the reasonable observer
knows that the cross is a religious symbol and that the cross is located in a
public square adjacent to the seat of government. She also is charged
with understanding that private speakers traditionally have used this
public square as a public forum open to First Amendment activities. In
fact, according to Justice O’Connor, the reasonable observer probably
has been to law school because she “would recognize the distinction
between speech the government supports and speech that it merely
allows in a place that traditionally has been open to a range of private
68
speakers accompanied, if necessary, by an appropriate disclaimer.” Our
reasonable observer is beginning to sound a great deal like a Supreme
Court justice.
Justice Stevens, in contrast, rejects a standard that requires the
reasonable observer to be highly informed and familiar with First
Amendment jurisprudence. Stevens argues that Justice O’Connor’s
“enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of place” in Establishment
Clause analysis because few observers would actually possess the

63

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted).
65
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
66
Id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67
Id. at 780.
68
Id. at 782.
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69

threshold of knowledge required by the Court. It is “presumptuous,”
Stevens insists, for the Court to demand the knowledge of the
“ultrareasonable observer” as a precondition of Establishment Clause
70
protection. Stevens recognizes the reality that different degrees of
knowledge will impact perception. The objective observer who carries a
comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of the display and its history is
likely to see through the eyes of the government rather than the
passerby.
The most recent decision addressing the objective observer, Salazar
v. Buono, shows the dispute concerning the knowledge of the observer
remains unresolved, although the highly knowledgeable observer appears
71
to be the most visible. Justices Kennedy and Alito attribute comparable
knowledge to the reasonable observer. Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion, in which Justice Alito concurs on this point, expects the
reasonable observer to know “all of the pertinent facts and circumstances
72
surrounding the symbol and its placement.” Justice Stevens, dissenting,
73
describes the observer simply as “well-informed.” He juxtaposes this
standard, in a footnote, however, against the “less informed reasonable
74
observer” that he supported in Capital Square Review.
V. THE REASONABLE OBSERVER AND THE ROLE OF BELIEF
The reasonable observer, schooled in government policy and
divested of religious identity, offers little insight into whether
government conduct actually alienates nonadherents and favors
75
adherents. The Court’s willingness to reduce perceptions of religious
endorsement to a discernable collection of facts shows little regard for
the role of belief in the reactions of the observer. This disregard
demonstrates a curious unresponsiveness to the real-life concerns about
religious strife that animate Establishment Clause history and prior
precedent.
Philosopher D. Z. Phillips argues that religious belief alters an
76
individual’s conception of the world. Thus, two people with different
religious belief systems, faced with the same facts, will “still reach
77
different moral conclusions.” In other words, when “moral perspectives
are different, different reactions will occur and different conclusions will
69

Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 807.
71
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811–12 (2010) (plurality opinion) (alleging
that a Latin cross in the Mojave National Preserve violates the Establishment Clause).
72
Id. at 1819–20.
73
Id. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 1834 n.4.
75
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
76
D.Z. PHILLIPS, FAITH AFTER FOUNDATIONALISM 117 (1988).
77
D.Z. PHILLIPS, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM 95
(1996).
70
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78

be drawn.” Michael McConnell describes a similar dynamic regarding
political belief: “Whether an observer would ‘perceive’ an . . .
[endorsement] depends entirely on the observer’s view of the proper
79
relation between church and state.” In fact, religious and political
beliefs together may influence perceptions; one adherent’s strong belief
in separation of church and state would produce a different answer on
the endorsement question than that of an adherent who favors closer
identification between religion and state. The reasonable observer
standard thus relies on the quite unreasonable assumption that
application of the standard will necessarily yield only one objective
answer.
Removing the views of adherents and nonadherents from the
perceptions of the reasonable observer does not resolve the problem of
subjectivity. If the reactions of actual people are irrelevant, the key
elements in determining endorsement are the knowledge of the observer
and the context for the government activity. But that analysis, too, is
80
“fraught with futility.” While the inquiry into the history and purpose
surrounding the government activity may be capable of reasonably
objective determination, the Court’s examination of context once again
begs the question of the perspective of the reasonable observer. The
Court’s assumption that it will be able to discern one reasonable
assessment of context is flawed for precisely the same reason as the
Court’s refusal to consider actual perceptions; the evaluation of context
is likely to yield a variety of reasonable results depending on the religious
and political beliefs of the observer.
VI. THE REASONABLE OBSERVER DRESSED FOR SUCCESS
The application of the reasonable observer standard thus becomes
normative, not objective at all. If varying belief systems may yield
different perceptions then there may, in fact, be more than one
reasonable observer. How does the Court choose? It is not surprising that
most of the cases in which the courts uphold displays of religious symbols
81
involve symbols of Christianity. The Court’s repeated insistence that the
Christmas tree is a secular, not religious, symbol demonstrates how the
82
reasonable observer embodies the perspective of the majority. The
Court’s determination of the religious meaning of the Christmas tree
78

Id. at 104.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48
(1985).
80
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
81
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
616 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See also ACLU of N.J. v.
Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 94–95 (3d Cir. 1999); Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51,
52 (2d Cir. 1997).
82
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 (majority opinion), 633 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
79
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means that the contradictory reactions of nonadherents are wrong as a
matter of constitutional law, a result at odds with promoting the value of
inclusion.
The Court’s severing of the reasonable observer from her beliefs
could be argued to serve two important normative functions. The first is
the principle that the Court should avoid determinations of the religious
significance of symbols or doctrine. The second is that the Court’s
disregard of the relationship between perception and belief advances
government neutrality toward religion. The reasonable observer standard
fails, however, to promote either objectivity or neutrality.
There are sound reasons for the Court to avoid engagement in the
determination of religious meaning, not the least of which is the Court’s
lack of expertise. The Court, rightly, has been careful to avoid
evaluations of religious beliefs and doctrines. However, this concern does
not justify the Court’s use of a standard that ignores both the role of faith
in perception and the likelihood that faith, or lack thereof, will produce
conflicting perspectives. To the contrary, this underlying rationale attests
to the flaws in the standard. There is little merit to a standard that serves
one Establishment Clause value at the expense of another, particularly
since the reasonable observer standard actually fails to remove the Court
from the business of evaluating perceptions.
The Court’s conclusions about the perspectives of the reasonable
observer are, in reality, infused with judgments about religious meaning.
The reasonable person’s embodiment of a predominantly Christian point
of view belies the purported objectivity of the standard. Substantive
analysis of the effect of government action upon adherents and
nonadherents would, by contrast, both further the value of inclusion and
remove the Court from questionable judgments about religious
significance processed through the reasonable observer fiction. If the
Court retains the reasonable observer, it should give her a dual identity:
that of reasonable adherent and reasonable nonadherent.
Also problematic is the argument that the reasonable observer
standard furthers a key Establishment Clause principle: government
83
Neutrality as an interpretive principle
neutrality toward religion.
provides only the most general guidance for government action under
the Establishment Clause. Neutrality has been the justification for
Establishment Clause tests that emphasize separation of religion and
84
government tests that favor accommodation. The formalism of the
reasonable observer standard offers only the most superficial

83

See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005). A minority of the
Court recently has argued that the Establishment Clause does not mandate
government neutrality toward religion; only government coercion is prohibited by
the Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 892, 909–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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interpretation of neutrality; the test fails to address the complex issues of
pluralism at the heart of the debate about neutrality.
VII. FORMALISM, NEUTRALITY, AND THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
Formalism is, in fact, leading to a reformulation of the neutrality
principle. The Court is increasingly receptive to the argument that
Establishment Clause challenges should be evaluated primarily on the
basis of government purpose, with a facially neutral purpose insulating
the government action from Establishment Clause challenge, much as
the Court has insulated the government from Free Exercise claims with a
85
similar definition of neutrality.
Recent Establishment Clause cases that focus on facial neutrality use
the reasonable observer fiction to bypass substantive analysis of
endorsement. In a series of decisions dealing with aid to parochial
schools or student religious groups, the Court has found that the
Establishment Clause is satisfied when the government distributes
benefits equally to secular and religious entities under generally
86
applicable laws. This finding represents a significant shift in analysis.
Whereas the Court previously had considered whether the government
activity represented an evenhanded treatment of aid recipients, it had
87
not found that facial neutrality alone was sufficient. In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, the Court upheld a state-financed tuition voucher
88
program that included sectarian schools. The Court found the program
did not violate the Establishment Clause because the money flowed to
89
religious schools through the private choices of families. Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion makes clear that the facial neutrality of the
program went a long way toward satisfying Establishment Clause criteria:
“[A] program . . . that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad

85

See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654–55 (2002) (“But we have
repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of
private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the
numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur
of government endorsement.”); Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982))).
86
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809–10 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842–43 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 267 (1981).
87
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
88
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643–44.
89
Id. at 654–55.
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spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
90
Establishment Clause.”
This focus on facial neutrality diminishes the weight given to the
effect of government support. In Zelman, the Court summarily rejects the
argument that state aid to religious schools created a public perception
of endorsement: “no reasonable observer would think a neutral program
of private choice . . . carries with it the imprimatur of government
91
endorsement.” To the contrary, “[a]ny objective observer familiar with
the full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view it
as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed
92
schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.” Not
surprisingly, the Court’s unwillingness to consider actual purpose leads
to a similar disinclination in evaluating effect.
The reasonable observer test collapses what had previously been
separate inquiries into government purpose and government effect into
one continuum of “reasonableness.” This comingling of two distinct
criteria is at odds with a long line of cases that makes clear that a neutral
government purpose alone does not defeat an Establishment Clause
93
claim. Under the Court’s reasonable observer standard, the important
question of whether the government action, quite apart from its purpose,
has the effect of endorsing religion becomes subsumed to the analysis of
formal neutrality that governs the question of government purpose. The
increasing emphasis on neutral government purpose further distances
Establishment Clause analysis from substantive consideration of how the
government action plays in the real world.
Disengaged from actual purpose or effect and disconnected from
the hard decisions central to Establishment Clause values, the viewpoint
of the reasonable observer becomes quite narrow. Familiar with
legislative history, the nuances of context, and the subtleties of
constitutional law, the reasonable observer is unlikely to conclude that
the government ever acts to endorse religion, absent clear evidence of
impermissible intent.
VIII. WHY THE REASONABLE OBSERVER?
Why has the reasonable observer standard emerged as a key focus of
Establishment Clause doctrine? Two explanations seem most likely. It can
be argued that the legal fiction of the reasonable observer helps insulate
the Court from criticism that it is imposing subjective value choices to
resolve the contentious issues presented in many Establishment Clause
90
Id. at 661 (alteration in original) (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–
99 (1983)).
91
Id. at 655.
92
Id.
93
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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cases. The analysis in Lynch, however, exposes the transparency of the
Court’s efforts to hide these choices behind the face of the reasonable
observer. By imbuing the reasonable observer with the perceptions of the
majority religion, the Court invites rather than diffuses criticism.
A more persuasive explanation for the emergence of the reasonable
observer lies in examining the shift in Establishment Clause doctrine that
parallels the adoption of the reasonable observer standard. A majority of
the Court has rejected strict separation of religion from government. The
prevailing theory is one that emphasizes government accommodation of
94
religion. The reasonable observer embodies this metamorphosis. The
Court’s repudiation of separationist values is reflected in the identity of
the objective observer. By ignoring the perspective of the nonadherent,
the reasonable observer disregards the protection of minority rights, an
important concern for separationists. Instead, the reasonable observer
who manifests the “collective social judgment” of the community will be
inclined to approve government accommodation of the majority. The
reasonable observer standard facilitates the Court’s reformulation of
Establishment Clause doctrine to reflect accommodationist values. In this
light, the importance assigned to neutral government purpose takes on
heightened significance. Under an accommodationist approach,
successful Establishment Clause challenges are more likely to require
evidence of religious discrimination or coercion; endorsement is relevant
only to the extent it demonstrates impermissible purpose.
This shift is likely to lead to increased visibility of majority religions
in the public arena. Since the reasonable observer is a person of
indeterminate religious beliefs, she is apt to be more familiar with the
displays and activities of majority religions. Familiarity, as the Court
reminds us, engenders acceptance, which in turn generates additional
government action, leading to the “ubiquity” that transforms religious
95
symbols into secular displays. Thus, every December, our reasonable
observer sees adorned Christmas trees and lighted menorahs on private
property throughout her community. Blind to the perceptions of
minority religions, she is expected to understand that when the
government displays a Christmas tree and menorah on the courthouse
lawn, it merely acknowledges the secular fact of the holidays and does not
endorse religion. That the reasonable observer should view government
religious displays through the eyes of the dominant religion will not
trouble the accommodationist majority on the Court.
Government neutrality is an important interpretive principle for the
Establishment Clause only to the extent it is a substantive standard. The
significance of neutrality is to ensure the government will avoid
fomenting the divisiveness that accompanies perceived government
favoritism or hostility toward religion. The formalism of the objective
94

See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also supra note 29
and accompanying text.
95

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737939

Do Not Delete

2010]

12/7/2010 10:57 PM

THE REASONABLE BELIEVER

1555

observer standard fails to address this concern in any substantive manner.
Instead, the reasonable observer formulation erroneously presumes that
the critical issues of inclusion and divisiveness will go away simply if the
Court ignores them.
Formalism may serve constitutional adjudication in other areas of
constitutional law, but religion is different. The Constitution recognizes
the uniqueness of religion and the hazards of religious strife through the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The reality and virtues of
religious pluralism impose on the Court a Herculean task in drawing the
line between permissible accommodation and impermissible
endorsement. The difficulty in drawing that line does not justify
abandoning the effort.
What is missing from the Court’s analysis of endorsement is
consideration of two key Establishment Clause concerns: (1) recognition
that the question of whether government action sends a religious
message will be answered differently depending on the religious and
political beliefs of the observers, and (2) a standard that addresses that
reality. That standard includes, as Justice Stevens argues in Van Orden, a
presumption against government display of religious symbols and a
vigorous and substantive inquiry into the purposes and effect of
96
government action that accommodates religion. This inquiry should
include, at the very least, consideration for the viewpoints of both
adherents and nonadherents.
The life expectancy of the reasonable observer is uncertain however.
The Court may be poised to recast Establishment Clause doctrine. The
coercion test finds an Establishment Clause violation only when the
government has coerced religious participation. If a majority of the Court
adopts the coercion test, which collapses Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise analysis into one question of coercion, judicial review of
government accommodation of religion would be significantly reduced.
At
bottom,
the
debate
between
separationists
and
accommodationists is not just about the permissible role of government
in accommodating and supporting religion. It also is about the role of
the Court. The Court, with legitimate reason, does not want to be in the
position of evaluating religious perspectives or values. Both separationist
and accommodationist theories insulate the Court from judgments about
religion. But they achieve that end in significantly different ways.
The separationist approach reduces the discretion of the Court
through a presumption against religious displays and government
support of religion. These presumptions clearly allow for less
accommodation of religion by government; in turn, they effectively
protect the rights of minorities and prevent divisiveness.
An accommodationist approach that merely rubber-stamps the
choices of the majority also insulates the Court from difficult choices
96

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708, 721–22 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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about religion. But it does nothing to further inclusion or prevent
religious divisiveness. Ultimately, the accommodationist approach
undermines Establishment Clause values rather than serves them.
IX. CONCLUSION
So where does this leave our reasonable observer as she
contemplates the display of the Christmas tree and the menorah on the
courthouse lawn? Well-schooled, her perceptions are shaped by her
knowledge that the government claims it intends only to convey secular
recognition of the holidays of December. She can take into account the
size and placement of the tree and menorah and any disclaimers or
explanatory materials. What she cannot do is react to the display as
governed by her beliefs. The response she is not allowed is, in truth, the
reaction that the Court must address to achieve an appropriate balance
between accommodation of the majority and protection of minority
religions. The reasonable observer test walks the Court away from the
real world into a fictitious world inhabited by characters disconnected
from their beliefs and their humanity. That these ciphers see the world
through the eyes of Supreme Court justices offers scant reassurance for
the protection of religious pluralism.
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